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I. INTRODUCTION
Internet service providers (ISPs) are gateways to the world of
cyberspace. They provide on-line access to individuals, educational
institutions, corporations, and government agencies. At the same
time, they can easily "pull the plug" on cyber-speech by taking down
t Irina Y. Dmitrieva is a Ph.DJJ.D. candidate at the University of Florida at Gainesville. The
author would like to thank Professors Bill Chamberlin and Thomas Cotter, University of
Florida, for their helpful comments, and Professor Donald Gillmor, University of Minnesota, for
sparking my initial interest in copyright law.
234 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAWJOURNAL [Vol.16
questionable material and terminating the accounts of specific users.
In this sense, ISPs have become on-line guardians of free speech.
ISPs, however, should not become Internet censors or decision
makers on what constitutes copyright violations on the Internet.
For example, fans of Homer J. Simpson may put his images on
their personal web sites.' Likewise, those who enjoy novels of Iris
Murdoch2 may quote her extensively on their web pages. Most
Internet users also hope that on-line services will notice their sites and
list them in their Internet directories, so that more people could visit
them. Fans believe that the fair use provision of copyright law
protects their use of copyrighted images or excerpts from the novels.
However, the owners of copyrights for the famous cartoon series or
Iris Murdoch's novels may think otherwise. In this situation, when
compilers of Internet directories come across such fan sites, should
they decide whether the sites violate copyright law? And if a
compiler decides that a violation occurred, should it immediately
block access to the site?
The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act
(OCILLA) signed into law in October 1998, 3 provides that ISPs are
required to expeditiously take down on-line material when they
become "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent." 4 The issue is: Just how "apparent" a copyright
infringement should be for a service provider to take restrictive
actions against it? In other words, should ISPs be expected to know a
copyright violation when they see it?
This article argues that in light of the OCILLA's legislative
history, courts should narrowly construe the new "awareness"
standard. If courts broadly interpret this requirement, ISPs may have
incentive to restrict more on-line material than necessary without fear
of being punished, because the same law shields them from liability
for taking down, in good faith, allegedly infringing content.5 Part I of
this paper provides an overview of the ISPs' liability in copyright
infringement suits before the passage of the statute. Part II
1. Homer Simpson is a leading character of the popular FOX animation series, The
Simpsons. Fan sites include The Simpsons Archive at <http://www.snpp.com>, Evergreen
Terrace at <http://www.milpool.com>, and The Simpsons Channel at
<http://simpsons.lardlad.com>.
2. Iris Murdoch is a famous 20th century British novelist.
3. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Tit. II, 105th Cong.
(1998).
4. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(ii) and (d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
5. See id. § 512(g)(1).
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summarizes the main provisions of the OCILLA. Part III describes
the legislative history of the statute, with particular focus on drafting
the new knowledge and awareness requirement. Finally, Part IV
argues for the narrow judicial interpretation of the new awareness
standard in light of the statute's language, structure, and legislative
history.
A. Liability of ISPs for Copyright Violations of Their Users
Before the OCILLA
Copyright law provides economic incentives for authors to
engage in creative activities by granting them a temporary monopoly
over their works.6 Exclusive rights of copyright owners include the
rights to reproduction, distribution, display and performance, and the
right to prepare derivative works. 7  To better ensure financial
remuneration of authors, copyright law imposes strict liability8 for
copyright violations. This means that an individual's intentions and
knowledge are irrelevant in determining whether a copyright violation
occurred. Courts find individuals strictly liable even for innocent
copyright violations.9
Strict liability principles of copyright law differ dramatically
from the liability principles in defamation and obscenity law, where
courts take into consideration the element of knowledge (scienter) on
the part of a defendant.10 Defamation and obscenity laws distinguish
between primary publishers and distributors, with the latter subject to
a more lenient standard of liability." On the contrary, under
copyright law, distributors such as bookstores may be found strictly
6. U.S. CONST. art.l, § 8, cl. 8.
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
8. The concept of liability is defined as "every kind of legal obligation, responsibility, or
duty;" "condition of being responsible for a possible or actual loss, penalty, evil, expense, or
burden:' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 914 (6th ed. 1990).
9. However, courts may consider the innocent character of a violation in assessing
punitive damages.
10. See for example Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1959), where the Supreme
Court invalidated on First Amendment grounds a Los Angeles city ordinance which imposed
strict criminal liability on a retail bookseller for possession of an obscene book. The Court held
that the ordinance, which did not consider the element of scienter (distributor's knowledge of
the contents of a book), inhibited freedom of expression by forcing booksellers to inspect the
contents of all reading materials they carry.
11. See for example Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), where the New York federal district court found a service provider not liable for
allegedly defamatory statements posted by its independent contractor, because, the court said,
Compuserve performed the role of a traditional news vendor.
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liable for unauthorized distribution of infringing materials.12
Courts base responsibility for copyright violations on three
theories of liability: Direct, vicarious, and contributory. Direct and
vicarious liability are examples of strict liability, which do not take
into consideration the element of knowledge. Direct infringement
occurs when an individual violates one of the exclusive rights of a
copyright owner. For example, direct violation occurs when a vendor
distributes bootleg recordings, or when a person reproduces a
copyrighted work without the author's permission.
Vicarious liability is imposed on an individual or entity that does
not commit a copyright violation, but directly benefits from it and has
the right and ability to control it. Vicarious liability is an outgrowth
of the doctrine of respondeat superior, according to which a master is
responsible in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servants. For
example, a dance hall owner may be found vicariously liable for
leasing his premises to a band that performs copyrighted songs
without permission.13
The only theory of liability that considers the element of
knowledge on the part of an infringer is contributory liability.
Contributory liability is an outgrowth of a common law principle that
those who knowingly participate in the act of direct infringement
should be held accountable for their wrongful actions. To be found
contributorily liable, a person "must have acted with the direct
infringer and must have known of the infringing activity.1 4  For
example, an operator of a retail copy service may be found
contributorily liable for helping his customers copy protected audio-
tapes by using his cassette recorder.t 5
With the development of the Internet, the question arose as to
which standard of liability should apply to ISPs. Two federal district
court decisions framed the debate on this issue. In the 1993 case,
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,t6 a Florida federal court ruled that
12. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994) grants copyright owners the exclusive right to distribute
copies of their works to the public. The distribution right applies to all copies of copyrighted
works, whether or not they were lawfully made. See NmIMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11. The
distribution right is limited by the "first sale" doctrine. Under 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994), a lawful
owner of a particular copy of a copyrighted work can sell or otherwise dispose of that copy
without the copyright owner's permission.
13. See Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d. 354, 355 (7th Cir.
1929).
14. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6:1 at 6.6 (2d ed. 1999).
15. See RCA Records v. All-Fast Systems, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335,340 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
16. 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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a computer bulletin board (BBS) operator was directly liable for
illegal materials posted to his system by subscribers. The court
ignored the fact that the BBS operator claimed he did not know about
copyright violations on his system, and, as soon as he learned about
them, he took down the infringing materials. This decision alarmed
the ISP community which said that imposition of strict liability on
service providers would compel them to monitor private
transmissions of their users in effort to detect potential copyright
violations.17  By monitoring transmissions of their subscribers, ISPs
risk violating another federal law, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, which prohibits interference with private digital
communications, such as electronic mail.18
In the 1995 case, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online
Communications,9 a federal court in California refused to follow
Florida's precedent in holding an ISP strictly liable for copyright
violations of its users. Instead, the court ruled that liability of ISPs
should be based on the theory of contributory infringement. Under
this theory, liability for participation in illegal activity is established
when the defendant, "with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another. '20  The California court's decision received fire from the
community of copyright owners who argued that, by introducing the
element of knowledge into the liability scheme, the court encouraged
ISPs to turn a blind eye on copyright violations on their networks. 21
The debate over the proper copyright liability standard for ISPs
unfolded in academic circles. Most of the research on this issue
appeared in law reviews. For example, Jane Ginsburg of Columbia
University School of Law argued that ISPs should be subject to the
strict liability standard because they facilitate transmissions of
17. "Absent clear lines of liability, service providers may have no practical defense to
crippling damages but the invasive monitoring and supervision of their subscribers' private
communications." Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1284 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 48 (1996) (statement of Robert Oakley, Digital Future
Coalition).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 105-55 1, Pt. 1, at 26 (1998) (stressing that the new statute does not
require ISPs to access, remove or disable access to material if in violation of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act).
19. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
20. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management Corp., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971), quoted in Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1382.
21. NIl Copyright Protection Act of 1995 (Pt. 2): Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subconm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 35-38 (1996) (statement of Edward M. Murphy, National Music Publishers' Association).
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infringing messages.22  Ginsburg also wrote that copyright owners
may choose to sue a bulletin board or commercial network operator as
a "profitable intermediary" to recover some of their losses from
copyright violations. 23
Others stressed that if ISPs are exposed to strict liability, they
would start monitoring transmissions on their networks, thus turning
into on-line censors. Law professor Niva Elkin-Koren wrote that
imposition of strict liability on ISPs is not a sound policy choice
because it would turn ISPs into inspectors, or supervisors of the on-
line information flow. 4 Pamela Samuelson of the University of
California at Berkeley also warned against ISPs becoming
"centralized control centers to enforce copyright law."25
Some scholars noted that under existing case law, ISPs can be
held vicariously and contributorily liable for activities of their users.
For example, Mary Ann Shulman wrote that ISPs who reap
advertisement revenue when users hit their web sites might be found
liable if the content includes infringing material.26
Several scholars came to the conclusion that courts should hold
ISPs accountable for acts of their users only if copyright owners can
demonstrate that ISPs had actual knowledge of copyright violations.
For example, Giorgio Bovenzi wrote that the appropriate standard of
liability for ISPs is negligence under the actual knowledge
requirement.27  According to Bovenzi, the actual knowledge
requirement would ensure the freedom of on-line communications
because ISPs would not have the incentive to monitor transmissions
of their users for potentially infringing content.28 Bovenzi suggested
that upon receipt of a complaint from a copyright owner, ISPs should
be required to remove an allegedly illegal message.29
22. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors,
Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1492-94 (1995).
23. See id. at 1499.
24. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & Err. L.J. 345,410 (1995).
25. Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 190.
26. See Mary Ann Shulman, Comment, Internet Copyright Infringement Liability: Is an
Online Access Provider More Like a Landlord or a Dance Hall Operator?, 27 GoLDEN GATE
U. L. Rvv. 555,599 (1997).
27. See Giorgio Bovenzi, Liabilities of System Operators on the Internet, 11 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93, 141 (1996). The article is available at (visited Mar. 15, 2000)
<http:l/www.law.berkeley.eduljoumalslbtljlarticlesll 1_l/Bovenzi/htll/reader.html>.
28. See id. at 139.
29. See id. at 140; see also Wendy Melone, Note, Contributory Liability for Access
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Unfortunately, neither case law nor academic commentary
provided a consistent solution to the problems of ISPs' liability for
copyright violations of their users. The answers to some of those
questions came in October 1998, when Congress enacted limitations
on copyright liability for ISPs as part of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.
B. Summary of Key Statutory Provisions
Congress passed the Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act (OCILLA)3° as Title II of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act,31 signed into law by President Clinton on October 28,
1998. OCILLA, which took effect on the same date, amended
Chapter 5 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act by adding a new
section called "Limitations on liability relating to material online.
32
OCILLA applies to ISPs and nonprofit institutions of higher
education in their capacity as service providers 3 It creates a number
of "safe harbors" for service providers against liability for copyright
violations of their users, based on the functions performed by service
providers. The liability limitations apply to four general categories of
activity: Transitory digital network communications,3 4  system
caching,35 storage of information residing on systems or networks at
Providers: Solving the Conundrum Digitalization Has Placed on Copyright Laws, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 491,506 (1997) (suggesting that copyright owners should be required to notify ISPs
of copyright violations on their networks).
30. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Tit. II, 105th Cong (1998).
31. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 105th Cong. (1998).
32. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West Supp. 1999).
33. The term "service provider" is generally defined as "a provider of online services or
network access, or the operator of facilities thereof." Id. § 512(k)(1)(B). For example, this
broad definition would include providers of Internet access, commercial on-line services, and
operators of individual computer bulletin boards (BBS).
OCILLA also provides an additional, more narrow definition of a service provider
which applies only to the subsection covering transitory digital network communications. For
the purposes of this subsection, a service provider is defined as "an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital on-line communications, between
or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to
the content of the material as sent or received." Id. § 512(k)(1)(A). In order to qualify for this
definition, a service provider must perform a passive role of a conduit-for instance, to provide
e-mail service, or mailing lists (Listserv).
34. The concept of "transitory digital network communications" describes the process of
"moving packets of information across digital online networks," such as forwarding e-mail
traffic or routing messages to a mailing list agent (Listserv). COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281 AS
PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998 26 (Comm.
Print Serial No.6 1998).
35. System caching is a technique employed by ISPs to speed up public access to popular
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the direction of users, 6 and information location tools. 37 These "safe
harbors" protect service providers from all monetary relief for direct,
contributory, and vicarious infringement, and substantially limit
injunctive relief against qualifying service providers.
To be eligible for liability limitations, service providers shall
designate an agent to receive notifications of copyright violations on
their networks38 and shall implement a policy for the termination of
accounts of those subscribers who repeatedly violate copyright.39 In
addition, service providers should not interfere with "standard
technical measures" used by copyright owners to identify and protect
their works.40 This provision reflects the belief of members of
Congress that, in the future, technology may provide solutions to
many issues facing copyright owners.41 The statute specifies that
"standard technical measures" should be developed by both copyright
owners and ISPs in "an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards
process. '42 For example, members of the House Committee on
Commerce anticipated that organizations such as the World Wide
Web Consortium, the Internet Engineering Task Force, or ad hoc
web sites. When a user requests access to a certain web site, a local Internet server
automatically makes a temporary copy of the requested file. This is done in case other users
from the same area would want to visit this particular site. In this case, they will access it from
the local server instead of re-calling the site from possibly thousands of miles away. See
Information Resource Caching FAQ (visited Feb. 5, 2000)
<http:llwww.ircache.nettCache/FAQ>.
36. "Examples of such storage include providing server space for a user's web page, for a
chatroom, or other forums in which material may be posted at the direction of users." COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., SECTION-BY-SECTION
ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON
AUGUST 4, 1998 26 (Comm. Print Serial No.6 1998).
37. The term "information location tools" refers to directories of on-line sites, search
engines, lists of recommended sites, hyperlinks. See id. at 32.
38. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
39. See id. § 512(i)(1)(A). Members of the House Committee on Commerce described the
goals of a copyright policy in the following way: "[Ihose who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse
their access to the Internet through disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others should
know that there is a realistic threat of losing that access." See also Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, Report on H.R. 2281 of the House Comm. on Commerce, Rept. 105-551,
Pt. 2, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., at 61 (1998).
40. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
41. See Report on H.R. 2281 of the House Comm. on Commerce, Rept. 105-551, Pt. 2,
105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 61 (1998); see also COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R.2281 AS
PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998 26, at 37
(Comm. Print Serial No.6 1998) (stressing that technology is likely to provide solutions to many
issues facing copyright owners and ISPs).
42. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
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industry groups, could take an active part in this process. 43
OCILLA essentially creates a series of affirmative defenses for
service providers who are found liable for copyright violations under
existing principles of law.44 At the same time, if service providers fail
to qualify for liability limitations under OCILLA, they still can assert
other defenses available under copyright law, such as the fair use
defense.45
Subsection (a) of OCILLA limits liability of service providers
who perform only a passive "conduit" function in the process of
transmitting, routing, or providing connections for digital
communications of others. This provision resembles the "passive
carrier" exemption of the Copyright Act.46 Under section 111(a)(3) of
the Copyright Act, certain "passive carriers" are exempt from
copyright liability as long as they do not directly or indirectly control
the content of their transmissions and clientele.47 Traditionally, the
passive carrier exemption has applied to communications common
carriers regulated by the Federal Communications Commission.
Examples of "passive" functions performed by ISPs include provision
of e-mail services, newsgroups, and listserv services.
For a service provider to qualify for the "conduit" limitation,
several conditions must be met: A service provider must not initiate,
select or modify the content of the communication; it must not
determine the recipients of the message, or maintain a copy of the
message on a system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to
other people for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the
transmission.48
Subsection (b) of OCILLA limits liability of service providers
for intermediate storage of material in the process of system caching,
43. See Report on H.R. 2281 of the House Committee on Commerce, Rept. 105-551, Pt. 2,
105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 61-62 (1998).
44. See Report on H.R. 2281 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Rept. 105-551, Pt. 1,
105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 26 (1998) ("[T]he exemption and limitations provided in this
subsection are affirmative defenses, like the exceptions and limitations established elsewhere in
title 17.").
45. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(1) (West Supp. 1999).
46. See Report on H.R. 2281 of the House Comm. on Commerce, Rept. 105-551, Pt. 2,
105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 63 (1998) (stressing that the definition of a service provider for
purposes of subsection (a) reflected the fact that the "functions covered by new subsection (a)
are essentially conduit-only functions").
47. 17 U.S.C.A. § 111(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that activities of passive carriers
should be limited to "providing wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of
others").
48. See id. § 512(a)(1-5).
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under certain conditions. These conditions include: no modification
of the material's content by a service provider; regular updating of the
material in accordance with accepted technical standards; no
interference with the ability of technology to return certain data to the
original site; and no circumvention of password mechanisms. 9 In
addition, a service provider shall expeditiously remove the material
claimed to be infringing upon notification from a copyright owner 0
The other two functions protected by the liability limitations-
information residing on a system or network at the direction of users
and information location tools-contain conditions that combine the
elements of contributory and vicarious liability. Subsection (c)
applies to activities such as provision of server space for users' web
pages or chat forums.51  Subsection (d) applies to the on-line
navigational tools, such as search engines, hypertext links, Internet
directories, and lists5 2
Both subsections establish a new knowledge standard for finding
the service providers' liability. They provide that ISPs shall not be
liable for third-party copyright violations if ISPs do not have actual
knowledge that the material or activity on their networks is infringing,
or, in the absence of such knowledge, are not "aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. 5 3  The
statute requires that, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, a
service provider must act expeditiously in removing the allegedly
infringing material off-line. In addition, to avoid liability, a service
provider shall not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity.
OCILLA establishes a somewhat different standard of
knowledge for nonprofit educational institutions in their capacity as
service providers. Subsection (e), inserted by the House and Senate
conference committee, provides that when a faculty member or
graduate student performs a teaching or research function, such
faculty or student's knowledge of infringing activities, generally, shall
not be imputed to an institution.54 Exceptions to this rule include
situations when infringing materials were officially required or
recommended for a class taught at an institution for the preceding
49. See id. § 512(b)(2).
50. See id. § 512(b)(2)(E).
51. Seeid.§512(c).
52. See id. § 512(d).
53. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(ii) and (d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
54. See id. § 512(e).
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three years; and when the institution received more than two
notifications of copyright violations within three years but failed to
act on them. In addition, institutions are required to implement a
copyright policy and to promote compliance with it.
OCILLA sets forth the rules for the "notice and take-down"
procedure,55 which provides that copyright owners may notify an ISP
of alleged copyright violations on the ISP's networks. Upon receipt
of such notification, an ISP is expected to "take down" or disable
access to the allegedly infringing material. The statute requires that
effective notification shall identify allegedly infringing works, and
provide information that would permit service providers to locate an
infringing site and to contact a copyright owner.56 In addition, the
notification shall include a good-faith statement from the complaining
party that the material in question violates copyright law 7
To balance the rights of copyright owners and users in the digital
environment, the statute also provides for the process of counter
notification. 8 Under this provision, a user whose material was taken
off-line at the request of a copyright owner, has the right to argue
(under the penalty of perjury) that the material was removed as a
result of mistake or misidentification. Upon receipt of a counter
notification, a service provider shall restore access to the allegedly
infringing material within 10 to 14 business days unless a copyright
owner files an action seeking a restraining court order.59 The statute
provides that a service provider is not liable for disabling access to an
allegedly infringing material, even if such material ultimately proves
to be non-infringing.60
Under OCILLA, copyright owners may request a federal district
court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an
alleged infringer.61 In this case, a service provider is required to
disclose to a copyright owner any identifying information it has in its
possession. However, a service provider is not expected to contact
other systems or networks for information they may have about a
potential infringer.6 2
55. See id. § 512(c)(3).
56. See id. § 512(c)(2)(iii, iv).
57. See id. § 512(c)(3)(v).
58. See id. § 512(g)(3).
59. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1999).
60. See id. § 512(g)(1).
61. See id. § 512(h).
62. See Report on HR 2281 of the House Comm. on Commerce, Rept. 105-551, Pt. 2,
105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 61 (1998).
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OCILLA provides that copyright owners cannot seek monetary
relief for activities of service providers that fall within the "safe
harbors." However, copyright owners still can seek limited injunctive
relief against a service provider. 3 The statute limits injunctive relief
to either blocking access to a particular on-line site, or terminating an
account of a subscriber who engages in infringing activities.64 In
issuing injunctions, courts shall balance the "magnitude of harm" to a
copyright owner against the burden on a service provider and the
technical feasibility and efficiency of an injunction. Courts also shall
consider the availability of less burdensome and comparably effective
means of blocking access to allegedly infringing material. 61
Finally, the statute provides that nothing in its language shall
condone invasion of users' privacy by service providers in the process
of monitoring for potential copyright violations. 66
C. Legislative History of OCILLA: Evolution of the Knowledge
Standard
1. The White Paper on Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure and
104th Congress
In 1993, the Clinton administration organized a task force on the
National Information Infrastructure to "fine tune" the copyright laws
to the realities of the digital world. The task force was headed by
then-Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Bruce Lehman. After
numerous public hearings and consultations with 22 federal agencies,
the task force came up with a 250-page report, the White Paper on
Intellectual Property and the National Infonnation Infrastructure (the
"White Paper").67 Addressing the issue of ISPs liability, the report
concluded that ISPs should be treated like other distributors under
copyright law and that they should be held strictly liable for copyright
violations of their users.68 The report did not recommend any changes
63. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(j) (West Supp. 1999).
64. See id. § 512(j)(1)(A)(iii). Courts are also allowed to order other types of injunctive
relief as long as they are "the least burdensome to the service provider among the forms of relief
comparably effective for that purpose [restraining infringement of copyrighted material]" Id.
65. See id. § 5120)(2).
66. See id. § 512(m).
67. Bruce Lehman (ed.), Intellectual Property and the National Information
hIfrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Washington,
D.C.: Information Infrastructure Task Force, September 1995.
68. "With respect to the allowance of uploading of material by their subscribers, they
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to copyright law in regard to ISPs' liability, claiming that existing
copyright law could be applied effectively to the Internet.69
However, when Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Carlos
Moorehead introduced bills based on the White Paper's
recommendations, ISPs and telephone companies immediately
criticized them for not addressing the issue of ISP liability.70 The bills
would have extended the copyright owner's exclusive distribution
right to include the right of transmission.71 ISPs argued that, under
the proposed legislation, they would be exposed to strict copyright
liability each time their users send infringing materials via their
networks . 72
Representative Rick Boucher, a member of both the House
Committee on the Judiciary and the House Committee on Commerce,
argued during the hearings that Congress should provide ISPs with an
incentive to invest in the development of computer networks without
fear of litigation. Boucher stressed the importance of balancing the
interests of copyright owners on the one hand with the ability of ISPs
to thrive on the other.73
During the House hearings, representatives of ISPs, such as
America Online, Compuserve, and Prodigy, also argued that exposure
to strict liability would make them monitor transmissions of
subscribers in an attempt to detect infringing content. 4 This could
violate First Amendment rights and invade the privacy of Internet
users. In addition, they argued, it would be impossible to detect all
copyright violations on their networks.75
[ISPs] are, in essence, acting as an electronic publisher." Id. at 122.
69. According to the report, the Copyright Act of 1976 was "fundamentally adequate and
effective" in addressing the new realities of the digital age. Id. at 212.
70. H.R. 2441 and S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995).
71. Id.§2(a).
72. "[The main problem ... is a pressure to shift the enforcement responsibility and
burden away from copyright owners.. and toward service providers by deeming them
violators of the copyright laws essentially, simply by virtue of their presence in the digital
infrastructure." NI! Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., at 234 (1995) (statement of Stephen Heaton, general counsel for Compuserve, Inc.).
73. See NI! Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2441 and S. 1284
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary
and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., at 80 (1995).
74. "Service providers must not be required to 'police' or 'monitor' transmissions." Nil
Act of 1995: Hearing on S.1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., at 38
(1996) (statement of William Burrington, American Online, Ic.).
75. The argument of ISPs was well summarized by Rep. Boucher, who said, "[w]ith
transmissions literally numbering in the tens of thousands on a daily basis for a given service,
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ISPs also argued that Congress should either immunize them
from liability altogether, or hold them responsible for copyright
violations of their users only when they have actual knowledge of
these violations.76 This actual knowledge standard could be fulfilled
by requiring a copyright owner to notify an ISP of copyright
infringements taking place on its network.
Copyright owners, on the other hand, argued that exempting
ISPs from strict copyright liability would encourage them to turn a
blind eye to on-line violations and would discourage them from
cooperating with copyright owners in detecting infringing conduct.
For instance, Edward Murphy, president of the National Music
Publishers' Association, said: "If an 'actual knowledge' standard
advocated by others is allowed to establish a safe haven from the
liability for infringements, we fear the creation of an on-line
environment in which ignorance is bliss." 77
Because of the sharp disagreements among copyright owners and
ISPs, neither Senate nor House subcommittees took any action on the
NII Copyright Protection Act. However, Congress decided to engage
the disputing parties in the negotiation process under the supervision
of Representative Bob Goodlatte. Goodlatte called for industry
negotiations at one of the hearings saying, "[t]his subcommittee [on
Courts and Intellectual Property] has a history of preferring that
commercial disputes be resolved between the parties rather than
through the legislative process, which may favor one interest group
over another."78
2. WIPO Treaties and 105th Congress
In the period between the 104th and 105th Congresses, the
United States became a party to two international copyright treaties
negotiated in Geneva at the diplomatic conference held by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in December 1996.19 The
that expectation of monitoring is clearly unrealistic." Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995:
Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., at 17 (1995).
76. "[B]ecause providers do not know the contents of the message they are transmitting or
distributing on a real-time basis, they are unable to use content as a basis for limiting users'
access to their systems unless they have actual knowledge that the material is indeed
infringing .... Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., at 235 (1995) (statement of Stephen Heaton, general counsel to Compuserve, Inc.).
77. Id. at 35.
78. See id. at20.
79. WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Message
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treaties did not specifically address the issues of ISP liability for
copyright violations of their users.80 However, the delegates to the
conference adopted a statement concerning Article 8 of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, according to which "the mere provision of physical
facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself
amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the
Berne Convention." 8' Thus, WIPO let individual countries establish
their own national standards for ISP liability under copyright law.
During the first session of the 105th Congress, several members
of Congress introduced bills to implement the WIPO treaties in the
United States. Two bills, introduced by Senator John Ashcroft and
Representative Howard Coble, addressed the issue of ISP copyright
liability.
Senate Bill 1146, the Digital Copyright Clarification and
Technology Education Act, sought to shield ISPs from direct,
vicarious, and contributory liability when they performed two types of
functions: Transmission 82 and temporary storage of material placed by
third parties on a system or network.8 3 The bill would have covered
services such as e-mail, real-time chat,84 on-line navigational aids,8"
and provision of server space for personal web pages.8 6 The bill
would have imposed liability on ISPs for copyright violation of their
users only if they received a notification from a copyright owner
about illegal acts on their networks and failed to remove the allegedly
infringing material. The bill was the first to introduce the standard of
actual knowledge for ISPs.
However, during the hearings Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of
the Judiciary Committee, stressed that the actual knowledge
requirement may not provide an incentive for ISPs to cooperate with
from the President of the United States, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY DOc. No. 105-17 (1997).
80. For a full discussion of the WIPo conference and treaties, see Pamela Samuelson, The
Digital Agenda of the WIPO: The US Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997).
Samuelson writes that there is no international consensus on the issue of whether intermediate
copying in computer's memory violates exclusive reproduction rights of copyright owners.
81. Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Adopted Dec. 20, 1996,
WIPO Doc. No. CRNR/DC/96 (1996). The text of the Agreed Statements is available at (visited
Mar. 15,2000) <http:/Icweb.loc.gov/copyrightlwipo/96dcag.html>.
82. Transmission included three types of services: Transmission of electronic
communications (e-mail), provision of real-time services (real-time chat), and supply of
information navigational tools (on-line directories and indexes). S. 1146, 105th Cong. § 512(a)
(1997).
83. Id. § 512(b).
84. See id. § 512(a)(2).
85. Id. § 512(a)(3).
86. Id. § 512(b).
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content providers in taking down the pirated sites.87
Another bill addressing the issues of ISP liability, House Bill
2180, would have added additional criteria for determining direct and
vicarious liability of ISPs, including the knowledge requirement.8
The knowledge requirement proposed in the bill would have shielded
an ISP from copyright liability if it "did not know, and was not aware
by notice or other information indicating, that the material was
infringing." 9  Representative Howard Coble, sponsor of the bill,
explained that this provision introduced an intermediate knowledge
standard-something between the actual knowledge and a general
standard of negligence.90 According to Coble, this intermediate
knowledge standard was based on the concept of "red flags"--facts,
which, even in the absence of notification from a copyright owner,
indicate existence of copyright violations.9'
However, during the hearings held by the House Judiciary
Committee, representatives of ISPs and telephone companies
criticized this intermediate standard of knowledge as imposing
"horrendous liability on carriers, on telephone companies and ISPs.'92
Representative Boucher once again spoke in favor of the actual
knowledge requirement and mandatory notice and take-down
procedure.93 However, the Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters,
87. Senator Hatch stated:
It seems to me that the content providers make a valid point when they ask what
incentives the service providers will have to continue cooperating with them to
take down pirated sites. It seems realistic to assume that not all service providers
are as ethical or as upright as you folks represented here today ....
The Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and Internet Service Providers: Hearing on S.
1146 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., at 41 (1997) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
88. H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997).
89. Id. § 512(a)(F)(i).
90. The Online Copyright Liability Limitations Act: Introductory Remarks, 105th Cong.,
144 CONG. REC. E1452 (daily ed. July 17, 1997) (statement of Hon. Howard Coble).
91. Id.
92. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and Online Copyright Liability
Limitation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., at 82 (1997) (statement
of Roy Neel, president of U.S. Telephone Association).
93. Rep. Boucher stated:
If the content provider knows that an infringement is taking place, the avenue for
obtaining relief should be to provide notice and a reasonable opportunity for the
OSP to take that information down.... Under the bill as drafted, OSP would be
liable for third-party infringement in instances where they have less than actual
knowledge of the infringement ... It should be replaced by the actual knowledge
standard.
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said that such a requirement would violate the provisions of the Berne
Convention and the TRIPS agreement 94 against imposition of
formalities on copyright owners.95
Representative Howard Berman best summarized the gist of the
dispute about the knowledge standard for ISPs. Berman suggested
that a compromise be found in establishing an intermediate
knowledge standard. He stated that: 'The answer is somewhere
between the conduit, who everybody agrees should not be liable,
and... something less than actual knowledge." 96
In February 1997, after several months of negotiations between
ISPs and copyright owners, Representative Coble re-introduced the
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act as House Bill
3209, which replaced his earlier House Bill 2180.97 The new bill
sought to shield ISPs from direct liability for copyright violations
occurring in the process of intermediate storage and transmission over
their networks.98 In addition, the bill provided that an ISP should not
be liable for monetary damages for contributory or vicarious
infringement, when (among other conditions), an ISP "does not know
and is not aware of information indicating that the material is
infringing."9 9  As Coble noted in his introductory remarks, the
knowledge requirement in House Bill 3209 was "nearly identical" to
that used in House Bill 2180.110
Coble explained that "information indicating that the material is
infringing" would include "a notice or any other 'red flag'-
information of any kind that a reasonable person would rely upon."'' 1
Such information, he wrote, would include the absence of digital
watermarks or other copyright management information. Coble
stressed that the bill would not impose on ISPs any affirmative duty to
seek out copyright violations on-line. 102
In his introductory remarks, Coble wrote that he intended to
Id. at 29 (statement of Rep. Boucher).
94. The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is a
part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI).
95. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and Online Copyright Liability
Limitation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., at 58 (1997).
96. Id. at 187.
97. H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1997).
98. Id. § 512(a)(1).
99. Id. § 512(a)(3)(A).
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codify the court's decision in RTC v. Netcom'03 which established
liability standards for ISPs." 4  Coble also stressed that the bill
intended to overturn the court's holding in Playboy Enterprises v.
Frena,10 5 "inasmuch as that case might apply to service providers,
suggesting that such acts could constitute direct infringement."' 06
The debate surrounding the issue of ISP liability culminated on
March 31, 1998, with an agreement between copyright owners and
ISPs.' 07 The next day, the House incorporated this agreement into
House bill 2281 (which included House bill 3209).108 A month later,
the Senate adopted the same language in the companion Bill 2037,
introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch.'09
The industry agreement shielded ISPs, under certain conditions,
from all types of liability and monetary damages for digital network
communications and system caching." 0  It also defined a new
standard of knowledge in regard to two other types of functions:
Temporary storage of information on networks and information
location tools. The new knowledge requirement provided that an ISP
shall not be held liable for certain activities if it "does not have actual
knowledge that the material or activity is infringing or, in the absence
of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent.""' According to the agreement,
ISPs that become aware of such facts or circumstances, have an
obligation to take down allegedly infringing material-otherwise,
they lose protection of the "safe harbors."" 2 Both the House and
Senate accepted this standard of knowledge and awareness without
modifications, and it became effective in October 1998, when
President Clinton signed into law the Digital Millennium Copyright
103. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
104. See supra note 100.
105. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
106. 144 CONG. REC. E160 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1998) (statement of Hon. Howard Coble).
In Frena, the Florida district court held a BBS operator liable for illegal acts of his users even in
the absence of knowledge on the part of the operator, who took infringing material off-line
immediately after notification. See 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
107. Industry Groups Reach Accord on Online Copyright Liability Legislation, 55 PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 557 (1998).
108. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998), Tit. II.
109. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998), Tit. II.
110. Agreement on Digital Copyright Liability, 55 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 564
(1998).




In the House Judiciary Committee report issued in May 1998,
House members explained that the new knowledge and awareness
standard created a so-called "red-flag" test. The report defined a "red
flag" as "information of any kind that a reasonable person would rely
upon."' 1 4 According to the report, examples of "red flags" would
include the absence of digital watermarks or other copyright
management information.115  Members of the House Judiciary
Committee stressed that the newly created knowledge requirement
differed from existing law, "under which a defendant may be liable
for contributory infringement if it knows or should have known that
material was infringing." ' 6
Two months later, the House Committee on Commerce issued its
own report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.' 7 The section
of the report explaining the "red flag" test reiterated the key points
from the report prepared by the House Judiciary Committee. The
members of the House Commerce Committee defined the "red flag"
test in the following way: "[W]hether infringing activity would have
been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or
similar circumstances."' 18 In addition, it explained that the "red flag"
test combined two elements-objective and subjective." 9 The report
advised that, in determining whether an ISP was aware of a "red
flag," courts should look into the "subjective awareness of the service
provider of the facts or circumstances in question."' 20 However, the
report also stated that in deciding whether facts or circumstances
constitute a "red flag," courts should apply an objective standard.'2'
Members of the House Commerce Committee did not clarify the
distinction between the objective and subjective tests that courts
should apply in determining whether an ISP was aware of a copyright
violation.
113. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, PL 105-304, Tit. 11, § 202(c)(i, ii, iii) and
(d)(1)(A, B, C) (1998).
114. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation: Report on H.R. 2281 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Rept. 105-551,
Pt. 1, 105th Cong., at 25 (1998).
115. Seeid.
116. Id.
117. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: Report on H.R. 2281 of the House Comm.
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The report prepared by the Senate Judiciary Committee in May
1998, described the "red flag" test in terms similar to those used by
the House Commerce Committee. Senate members clarified that the
new test did not create an affirmative obligation on part of an ISP to
monitor its networks or to seek out copyright violations. 22 However,
if a provider became aware of a "red flag," it would lose the "safe
harbor" protection unless it took steps to remove infringing content
off-line. 123
In October 1998, members of the House and Senate met in a
conference committee and prepared a conference report on the Digital
Millennium Act. 24 Members of the conference committee stressed
that the new liability standard for ISPs was designed to preserve
"strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to
cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take
place in the digital networked environment. '125  The only
disagreement between the two houses on the limitation of liability
provisions concerned the standards of liability for non-profit
educational institutions in their capacity as service providers. The
House version of the bill would have relieved institutions from certain
types of liability when they passively transmit communications
initiated by a student or a faculty member.126 The Senate version of
the bill would have required the Register of Copyrights to consult
with representatives of copyright owners and educational institutions
and to submit to Congress recommendations regarding the liability of
institutions for third-party copyright violations. 27
In the process of negotiating the bill's provisions, the two houses
agreed on a different knowledge standard for educational
institutions. 28 Members of Congress made it very difficult to sue
institutions for on-line copyright violations committed by their faculty
and graduate students. The bill provided that educational institutions
122. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: Report on S. 2037 of the Senate
Commn. on the Judiciary, Rept. 105-190, 105th Cong. (1998).
123. See id. at 44.
124. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: Conference Report on H.R. 2281, Rept.
105-796, 105th Cong. (1998).
125. id, at72.
126. See CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.,
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R.2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ONAUGUST4, 1998 26, at28 (Comm. Print Serial No.6 1998).
127. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: Report on S. 2037 of the Senate
Conn. on the Judiciary, Rept. 105-190, 105th Cong., at56 (1998).
128. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: Conference Report on H.R 2281,
Rept. 105-796, 105th Cong., at 74-75 (1998).
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would be presumed to know about third-party violations only if
infringing materials were a part of the required course list for the class
taught at an institution for the past three years; and if the institution
received more than two notifications of copyright violations and
failed to act on them.'29
D. Suggestions for Court Interpretation of the New Knowledge
Requirement
The new definition of the knowledge standard is at best vague.
The phrase, "facts and circumstances, from which copyright
infringement is apparent," gives courts the discretion to decide what
they consider "apparent" violations of copyright on Internet networks.
For example, when compilers of Internet directories come across
a fan site with a large picture of the Star Trek starship, should they
consider it an "apparent" copyright infringement and block access to
the site? This violation would probably be "apparent" to Viacom and
Paramount Pictures, which produce the Star Trek series. However,
should an ISP be expected to know a copyright violation, when it sees
it?
When the language of the statute is not plain on its face, courts
often turn to the statute's legislative history to determine the purposes
of its enactment and particular activities targeted by the legislation. 130
The following section argues for narrow judicial construction of the
new knowledge and awareness standard set by Congress for ISPs in
copyright infringement suits. The key tools of statutory construction
are, in the order of their importance: Language, structure, and
legislative history of the statute."' The argument follows this order
by: (a) analyzing the "plain language" of the new knowledge
provision; (b) comparing it to other parts of the same statute; and (c)
considering the purposes with which Congress enacted the legislation.
1. New Knowledge Standard Should be Construed in
Comparison With the Language Rejected or
Modified by Congress
The new "knowledge and awareness" standard should be
construed in comparison with other language considered and rejected
by Congress in the process of drafting the statute. For example,
129. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(e) (West Supp. 1999).
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Congress did not endorse the language of House Bills 2180 and 3209
which defined the knowledge requirement as "information indicating
that the material is infringing.' 132  During the House hearings,
witnesses testified that this language is too broad and unspecified and,
as a result, could expose ISPs to a "horrendous liability. '133
In addition, the enacted awareness standard falls short of the
actual knowledge requirement introduced in Senate Bill 1146. The
latter provided that ISPs should be required to take down certain
materials only when they are notified of an alleged violation by a
copyright owner. 34 This proposal was rejected because copyright
owners were concerned that it would encourage ISPs to turn a blind
eye to copyright violations on their networks. 35
Members of the House and Senate also distinguished the new
awareness standard from the knowledge standard applied previously
by the courts. In cases of contributory infringement, courts applied
the test of constructive knowledge: Whether a person knows or should
have known about illegal activities. 36  Thus, the constructive
knowledge test involves the element of inference-"a process of
reasoning by which a fact or proposition... is deduced as a logical
consequence from other facts."' 37 In other words, the constructive
knowledge standard does not necessarily require direct evidence of a
copyright violation.
On the contrary, the term "apparent" used in the new statute
means "manifest," "open to view," or "plain.' ' 38 Therefore, it can be
argued that, unlike the test of constructive knowledge, the
requirement to be aware of "apparent" copyright violations does not
involve the element of logical deduction or inference by an ISP.
Under the new law, to imply knowledge or awareness on the part of a
132. H.R. 2180, § 512(a)(1)(F)(i); H.R. 3209, § 512(a)(3)(A), 105th Cong. (1998).
133. Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2180 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm, on thte Judiciary, 105th Cong., at 82 (1997) (statement of Roy
Neel).
134. S. 1146, 105th Cong, Tit. I, See. 102, § 512(b).
135. "Removing the possibility of liability would eliminate the incentive for Internet access
providers to help deter infringements. It would discourage them from working with the creative
community to combat on-line piracy. We need cooperation, not immunity." Hearing on S.1146
Before the Senate Conn. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., at 15 (statement of Cary Sherman,
general counsel to Recording Industry Association of America).
136. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Marobie-Fl, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire and Equip. Distrib. and
Northwest Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
137. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 778(6th ed. 1990).
138. Id.at 96.
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service provider, infringement should be "plain" and "manifest" to a
reasonable person.
In fact, a congressional committee provided examples of when
application of the new awareness standard would be appropriate. The
section-by-section analysis of the statute performed by the House
Committee on the Judiciary states that copyright violations would be
apparent from the use of words such as "pirate," "bootleg," or similar
slang terms in the Internet addresses of certain web sites. 139
The analysis of the statutory language, thus, demonstrates that
the new knowledge and awareness standard is less stringent than the
standard of actual knowledge. However, it is more difficult to prove
than the standard of constructive knowledge, applied previously by
the courts. Congress intended the new knowledge standard to be
applied only under very specific circumstances, where there could be
no reasonable doubt as to the illegal character of the activities.
2. Structural Analysis: Congress Intended Courts to
Narrowly Construe the Statutory Provisions
that Impose Burdens on ISPs
When the language of the statute leaves doubts about the way a
certain provision should be interpreted, courts often turn to the
statute's overall structure. It can be argued that the new knowledge
and awareness standard calls for narrow interpretation because
Congress intended courts to interpret narrowly other provisions of the
same statute. Examples of such narrow construction include the
knowledge standard for nonprofit educational institutions, 140 the
concept of "direct financial benefit" attributable to infringing
activities,14' imposition of injunctions on ISPs,142 and the requirement
that ISPs must release to copyright owners information about their
139. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.,
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R.2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998 26, at 33 (Comm. Print Serial No.6 1998).
140. The statutes defines the principles of copyright liability for nonprofit educational
institutions in section (e). See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(e) (West Supp. 1999).
141. The concept of a financial benefit directly attributable to infringing activities
originates in the theory of vicarious liability. According to this theory, a person may be found
responsible for illegal acts of others if he or she derives financial benefit from illegal activities
and has the right and ability to control them. The new statute incorporates the element of direct
financial benefit in sections (c) and (d). See id. § 512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2).
142. Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides that copyright owners may
seek a limited injunctive relief against ISPs. See id. § 5120). An injunction is a court order
prohibiting someone from doing certain specified acts. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 784
(6th ed. 1990).
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subscribers when issued a subpoena. 43
During the conference proceedings, members of Congress
designed a provision addressing the liability of nonprofit educational
institutions, in their capacity as service providers, for copyright
violations committed by their faculty and graduate students. The
statute provides that an institution would be held liable for third-party
violations only a) if the infringing materials were required or
recommended for a course taught at a university during the preceding
three years, b) if the institution during these three years has received
more than two notifications of a copyright violation and failed to act
on them. 44
This provision makes it very hard to sue a nonprofit educational
institution for a copyright infringement by one of its employees.
First, it takes more than two valid notifications from a copyright
owner informing the institution of alleged copyright violations.
Second, the course for which infringing materials were used must be
taught for at least three years. Third, in the conference report
Congress defined "required or recommended" materials very
narrowly, as "instructional materials that have been formally and
specifically identified in a list of course materials that is provided to
all students enrolled in the course for credits.' ' 45 For example, this
definition would not include materials distributed by a professor or a
graduate student once an academic semester has started, or posted on
a class web site without being formally included on a list of required
readings.
Therefore, for an institution to become liable for third-party
violations, it has to blatantly ignore the facts of copyright
infringement identified at least twice, in good faith, by copyright
owners.
Another concept that requires a narrow judicial construction is
that of "a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity.' ' 46 Some legal scholars interpreted the California federal
district court's decision in Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 47 as
143. OCILLA provides that copyright owners can request a federal district court to issue an
ISP a subpoena, requesting the release of information identifying an alleged infringer.
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(h) (West Supp. 1999).
144. See id. § 512(e).
145. Digital Millennium Copyright Act- Conference Report on H.R. 2281, Rept. 105-796,
105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 75 (1998).
146. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2) (West Supp. 1999). "Direct financial benefit" is an
element of the test for establishing vicarious liability.
147. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held a
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exposing ISPs to vicarious liability for illegal activities of their users,
because they derive financial benefit from the monthly subscription
fees. 148 In addition, infringing activities arguably may attract new
subscribers to ISPs.
Addressing these concerns, the report of the House Committee
on Commerce advised courts to take a "common-sense, fact-based"
approach to the requirement of direct financial benefit from infringing
activities. 149 The report stressed that a "direct benefit" concept would
not include one-time set-up fees and flat periodic payment, or fees
based on the length of a message. According to the report, courts
should apply the concept of direct financial benefit only in the
circumstances where, "the value of the service lies in providing
access to infringing materials.' 5°
Therefore, the concept of a direct financial benefit, as explained
by Congress, would apply only to pirate directories which make their
revenue by providing access to unauthorized materials on-line. At the
same time, the concept of direct financial benefit would not apply to
an ISP that has at least some subscribers who engage in legal
activities.
Another example of the statute's provision that calls for narrow
judicial construction is the disclosure of information about an alleged
infringer by a service provider, who received a subpoena.15' The
report of the House Commerce Committee explained that such
disclosure should be interpreted as "requiring disclosure of
information in the possession of the service provider, rather than
obliging the service provider to conduct searches for information that
is available from other systems or networks.' 52  In other words,
Congress instructed courts to construe the disclosure provision
narrowly, without imposing additional burdens on ISPs.
The provision establishing standards for injunctions against ISPs
is yet another example of the legislative intent to interpret narrowly
flea market operator contributorily and vicariously liable for an independent vendor's sale of
bootleg recordings. The court decided that the flea market operator reaped financial benefits
from admission fees, parking fees, food and other service expenses paid by customers, "who
want[ed] to buy the counterfeit recordings at bargain basement prices." Id. at 263.
148. See Shulman, supra note 26.
149. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: Report of the House Committee on
Commerce on H.R. 2281, Rept. 105-551, Pt. 2, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 54 (1998).
150. Id.
151. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(h) (West Supp. 1999).
152. Report on H.R. 2281 of the House Comm. on Commerce, Rept. 105-551, Pt. 2, 105th
Cong. 2d Sess., at 61 (1998).
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some of the statute's provisions. 53 The statute instructs courts to
consider several criteria before issuing injunctions against ISPs. In
particular, courts shall consider if an injunction balances the
"magnitude of harm" to a copyright owner against considerations of
burden on an ISP, technological feasibility, and effectiveness of
injunctions and availability of other, less burdensome and effective
means of preventing access to infringing materials.154 By imposing
specific restrictions on issuance of injunctions against ISPs by courts,
Congress demonstrated that injunctive relief should be used very
sparingly, as the last recourse.
3. The Purpose of the New Statute is to Encourage ISPs to
Invest in the Internet Development by
Limiting Their Vulnerability to Copyright
Litigation
One of the main purposes in limiting ISPs liability for third-party
infringements was to encourage economic growth and technological
development of the Internet. Members of Congress realized that ISPs
should not fear creating new services and continuing to invest in the
development of digital networks. For example, the House Committee
on Commerce stressed in its report the importance of balancing the
interests of copyright owners, Internet providers and Internet users to
"foster the continued development of electronic commerce and the
growth of the Internet.' 155
Senator Hatch expressed the same idea speaking on the Senate
floor before the passage of the conference report, saying "[t]he OSPs
[on-line service providers] and ISPs need more certainty in this area
in order to attract the substantial investments necessary to continue
the expansion and upgrading of the Internet. 156
One of the ways to encourage activities of ISPs is to limit their
exposure to strict liability under copyright law. On numerous
occasions, members of the House and Senate stressed that the new
statute is designed to clarify provisions of copyright law and to
provide greater certainty for service providers as to their duties and
rights in the digital environment. 5 7
153. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(j)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
154. See id.
155. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: Report of the House Committee on
Commerce on H.R. 2281, Rept. 105-551, Pt. 2, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 21 (1998).
156. 144 CONG. REc. S11889 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
157. See Conference Report: "Title II provides greater certainty to service providers
concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their
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The report of the House Committee on Commerce specifically
addressed the issue of potential exposure to copyright liability of
information location tools including Internet directories such as
Yahoo!. The report stressed that further development of navigational
tools is "essential to the development of the Internet; without them
[information location tools], users would not be able to find the
information they need." 158 Members of Congress wrote that on-line
catalogers should not be penalized for exercising "human judgment
and editorial discretion" by being subject to copyright liability
whenever they come across a site that might be infringing 9
According to the report, liability should not attach to a directory
provider for simply seeing, during a brief cataloguing visit, several
"well known photographs of a celebrity at a site devoted to that
person. 160 The report stated that ISPs cannot be expected to know
whether the image is still copyrighted or in the public domain, or
whether it is licensed or used under the fair use doctrine.
Members of Congress realized that if the knowledge of copyright
infringements is imputed to an on-line cataloguer every time he or she
comes across questionable content, ISPs would have little incentive to
use man-made on-line directories or would extensively censor on-line
speech. For example, the House Commerce Committee report stated:
"The knowledge or awareness standard should not be applied in a
manner which would create a disincentive to the development of
directories which involve human intervention.' 6'
Therefore, one of the key purposes in enacting the ISP liability
limitation statute was to encourage development of the on-line
services by shielding them from extensive litigation.
4. By Limiting ISPs' Liability, Congress Intended to Place
Primary Responsibility in Detecting
Copyright Violations on Copyright Owners
Members of Congress wanted to make certain that the
responsibility of fighting on-line copyright violations would be
distributed fairly among copyright owners and ISPs.162  Many
activities." Rept. 105-796, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., at72 (1998).
158. Report of the House Committee on Commerce on H.R. 2281, Rept. 105-551, Pt. 2,
105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 58 (1998).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 57-58.
161. Id.at58.
162. See Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., at
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congressional discussions stressed that service and content providers
have a common interest in developing the full potential of the
Internet, and thus should share responsibility for detecting copyright
abuses. For example, the conference report describes the purpose of
the liability provisions as preserving "incentives for service providers
and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright
infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.' ' 63
However, Congress decided that it should be the primary
responsibility of copyright owners to police the net for potential
copyright violations because they are in the best position to make
well-informed judgments whether a certain use constitutes a copyright
violation. The report of the House Commerce Committee states that
ISPs cannot be expected to know whether a certain use is licensed or
allowed under the fair use doctrine. 164
In fact, Congress went to great lengths to make clear that only
"obvious" violations would imply "awareness" on the part of an ISP.
For instance, the House Judiciary Committee explained that under the
new knowledge requirement, an ISP "would not qualify for the safe
harbor if it turned a blind eye to 'red flags' of obvious
infringement.' ' 65  Examples of "obvious" violations would include
pirate directories containing links to big volumes of unauthorized
materials, such as copyrighted audio and video clips. 66
Congress carefully designed the statute to make sure that the key
responsibility in resolving copyright disputes lies with copyright
owners and Internet users. The statute provides for the notification
procedure when a copyright owner lets an ISP know about potential
copyright violations on its network. 67 In order to be actionable, a
notification must contain a copyright owner's good-faith statement
that a violation occurred.
In addition, the statute provides for the procedure of a counter
notification, allowing an Internet user to disagree with the copyright
19 (1996) (statement of Rep. Sonny Bono).
163. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at72 (1998).
164. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-551, PL 2, at58 (1998).
165. See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.,
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R.2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998 26, at 33 (Comm. Print Serial No.6 1998).
166. "Location was clearly, at the time the directory provider viewed it, a 'pirate site' of the
type described below, where sound recordings, software, movies, or books were available for
unauthorized downloading, public performance, or public display." H.R. REP. No. 105-551, Pt.
2, at 57 (1998).
167. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
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owner's claims. 68  Both notification and counter notification
procedures were designed to make certain that the primary
responsibility in resolving difficult issues of copyright law lies with
the parties best suited to address them-copyright owners and alleged
infringers.
The role of ISPs, on the contrary, is to educate their subscribers
by implementing a copyright policy. 69 Such policy would warn
Internet users that if they violate copyright laws, ISPs will take down
their materials.
II. CONCLUSION
The language, structure, and purpose of the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act indicate that Congress
recognized the important role ISPs play in the development of the on-
line infrastructure and tried to ensure that measures restricting their
operation would be used sparingly.
In particular, courts should construe narrowly the new
knowledge and awareness standard articulated in OCILLA.
Otherwise, ISPs would have an incentive to restrict more on-line
speech than necessary to enforce copyright law on the Internet. For
example, on-line catalogers should not be expected to detect
copyright violation simply by visiting web sites with the posted
celebrity photos or images of famous cartoon characters. As long as
there is a reasonable element of doubt whether a certain use is
licensed or excused under the fair use doctrine, ISPs should not take
the material down.
The legislative history of the statute shows that Congress
intended the new awareness requirement to apply under very narrow,
specific circumstances. For example, when web sites contain words
such as "pirate" and "bootleg." The language and structure of the
statute also indicate that the primary responsibility in detecting
copyright violations on-line lies with copyright owners.
168. See id. § 512(g)(3).
169. See id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
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